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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is conferred on the Utah Supreme Court pursuant 
to Article VIII, § 3 of the Constitution of the State of Utah and 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3) (j) (1987), because the Utah 
Court of Appeals has no original appellate jurisdiction under Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(1987). The Supreme Court has exercised its 
discretion to transfer this case to the Court of Appeals pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4) (1987) and the Court of Appeals has 
jurisdiction in this case pursuant to § 78-2a-3(2) (k) (1987) . 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue One: Whether the district court abused its discretion 
by conducting proceedings to determine the value of Slattery's 
stock. 
Statement of Review: The appellate court will review the 
district court's decision to receive evidence on the value of 
Slattery's stock on an abused of discretion standard. Street v. 
Fourth Judicial District Court, 113 Utah 60, 191 P.2d 153 (1948). 
The appellate court can only reverse the trial court for an abuse 
of discretion when there is no reasonable basis for the decision of 
the trial court. Crookston v. Fire Insurance Exchange, 860 P.2d 
937, 938 (Utah 1993). 
Issue Two: Whether the district court abused its discretion 
by allowing Slattery to amend her complaint and by conducting 
proceedings to determine Slattery's appellate attorney's fees and 
costs. 
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Standard of Review: The appellate court will review the 
district court's decision to receive evidence on the cost of 
Slattery's attorney's fees and costs on appeal and at the 
subsequent evidentiary hearing on an abused of discretion standard. 
Street v. Fourth Judicial District Court, 113 Utah 60, 191 P.2d 153 
(1948). The appellate court can only reverse the trial court for 
an abuse of discretion when there is no reasonable basis for the 
decision of the trial court. Crookston v. Fire Insurance Exchange, 
860 P.2d 937, 938 (Utah 1993). 
Slattery objects to the characterization of the issues as 
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 jurisdictional" and the standard of review as "correctness". The 
basis of this standard, according to Covey, is State v. Thurman, 
846 P.2d 1256, 1270, n.ll (Utah 1993). However, this case and 
footnote do not support Covey's conclusion that the decision of the 
trial court to receive evidence on the value of stock and 
attorney's fees and costs on remand is jurisdictional and should 
therefore be reviewed on appeal for correctness. Covey's 
characterization of the issues and standard of review are contrary 
to the statements of the Supreme Court in relation to the 
discretion of the trial court on remand. The Supreme Court has 
stated: 
. . . [W] here the entire case is not settled by the 
appellate tribunal where certain issues are left open by 
its judgment or decree, the trial court ordinarily has 
discretion to permit amended or supplemental pleadings as 
to those matters which have been left open. 
The rule is well stated in 3 Am. Jur. 737, Sec. 
1241: "If a cause is remanded without specific 
directions, or with general directions for a new trial 
either upon an affirmance or reversal, the lower court 
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has, as a general rule, the power to permit amendments 
and the parties are free to make such proper amendments 
to the pleadings as the trial court in its discretion may 
allow. . . . And while it may be said that such 
amendments to the pleadings are not a matter of right, 
but may be allowed in the discretion of the court, it is 
the duty of the trial court to exercise it's discretion 
in the matter of allowing amendments, unless the findings 
and conclusions of the appellate court cover the entire 
case and leave nothing open for further examination, 
thereby making it the duty of the trial court to enter 
judgment in accordance with the decision rendered." 
The principles boil down to this fundamental 
proposition: As to all matters adjudicated by the 
appellate court, both the trial court and the parties are 
foreclosed from further trying those matters. They 
become the law of the case. But as to matters left open 
by the appellate court, it is within the sound discretion 
of the trial court to permit amended or supplemental 
pleadings as to those matters. [Emphasis added] 
Street v. Fourth Judicial District Court, 113 Utah 60, 191 P.2d 
153, 158 (1948). The trial court, then, has significant discretion 
over the conduct of the proceedings on remand. This discretion is 
not jurisdictional as to the power of the trial court. The trial 
court has its full jurisdiction over a remanded case, just as if 
the case had never been tried. The trial court simply must not 
transcend the law of the case established on appeal. 
The rule is well settled that, where a judgment is 
reversed and remanded with specific instruction or 
directions, the case stands in the lower court precisely 
as it did before a trial was had in the first instance. 
Hidden Meadows Development Co. v. Mills, 590 P.2d 1244 (Utah 
1979) (citing Larsen v. Gasberg, 43 Utah 203, 134 P. 885, 887 
(1913)). After the appellate court has made its decision and 
remitted the case back to the trial court, the case stands in the 
trial court as if it had never been tried. Therefore, the 
jurisdiction of the trial court is not at issue; the proper issue 
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is whether the trial court properly exercised its discretion in 
deciding what issues to consider. Therefore, the abuse of 
discretion standard is appropriate to review the taking of evidence 
and allowing amended pleadings by the trial court on remand. 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY 
Rule 30(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedures states: 
. . . The court may reserve, affirm, modify, or otherwise 
dispose of any order or judgment appealed from. If the 
findings of fact in a case are incomplete, the court may 
order the trial court or agency to supplement, modify, or 
complete the findings to make them conform to the issues 
presented and the facts as found from the evidence and 
may direct the trial court or agency to enter judgement 
in accordance with the findings as revised. The court 
may also order a new trial or further proceedings to be 
conducted. If a new trial is granted, the court may pass 
upon and determine all questions of law involved in the 
case presented upon the appeal and necessary to the final 
determination of the case. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Susan Slattery (hereinafter "Slattery") is a former employee 
of Covey & Co. (hereinafter "Covey"), who initiated this litigation 
to recover damages she suffered when Covey defamed her. Covey 
counterclaimed and alleged that Slattery owed Covey the outstanding 
balance in Slattery's error account. After a bench trial, the 
trial court dismissed Slattery's claim for defamation and held that 
Covey was not entitled to the balance of Slattery's error account 
and that Slattery was entitled to offsets and the value of her 
stock. The trial court awarded judgement to Slattery to the extent 
the offsets and value of her stock exceeded the balance of the 
error account. Covey appealed and the Court of Appeals affirmed in 
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part, reversed in part, and remanded in part for further 
proceedings. On remand, the trial court received evidence and 
awarded a judgment to Slattery for the value of her Future Time 
stock and Bell Weather stock. The trial court also awarded 
Slattery her attorney's fees and costs incurred on appeal and at 
the evidentiary hearing conducted on September 2, 1993. On 
December 8, 1993, Covey & Co. filed notice of appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
1. On July 7, 1993, the Utah Court of Appeals rendered its 
decision in Slattery v. Covey & Co., Inc., 857 P. 2d 243 (Utah App. 
1993)(Case No. 910570-CA)("Slattery I"). In its opinion the Utah 
Court of Appeals held that Slattery " . . . was owed the value of 
her personal accounts . . ."by Covey, but reversed the judgment as 
to the value of her securities because the evidence lacked 
sufficient basis. Id. at 249. The Court of Appeals remanded the 
case to the trial court for "further proceedings consistent with 
[its] opinion. Id. at 250. 
2. On August 6, 1993, the Utah Court of Appeals issued a 
notice of remittitur in Slattery I. R. 779. 
3. On August 18, 1993, counsel for Slattery scheduled a 
hearing on the value of securities in Slattery's personal account 
at Covey. R. 793. 
4. On September 1, 1993, Slattery moved to amend the 
pleadings to allow the trial court to award attorney's fees and 
costs. R. 802, 804. 
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5. On September 2, 1993, a hearing before the district court 
was held. At that hearing, counsel for Covey objected to 
Slattery's claim for fees and the value of the stock arguing that 
the district court had no jurisdiction on remand to hear those 
issues. R. 919-925. The district court overruled the objection 
and allowed Slattery to present evidence on attorney's fees and the 
value of the securities. R. 913-977. 
6. The district court entered Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law finding the value of Future Time and Bell 
Weather stock and reserved the issue of attorneys' fees for further 
briefing. R. 834-36. 
7. After briefing the attorney's fee issue, on October 14, 
1993, the district court issued a minute entry awarding attorney's 
fees for the appeal of Slattery I and for the September 2, 1993 
hearing. R. 894-95. 
8. On November 8, 1993, the District Court entered judgment 
against Covey and in favor of Slattery. R. 896-98. 
9. On December 8, 1993 Covey filed a notice of appeal. R. 
899. 
10. Covey does not challenge the sums awarded to Slattery, 
but only whether the district court had jurisdiction to consider 
the value of the stock and the attorney's fee issues. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The Court of Appeals in Slattery I reversed and remanded part 
of the trial court's decision for further proceedings. Those 
proceedings were to make findings concerning Slattery's expenses 
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and to determine the value of the stock Slattery owned. The Court 
of Appeals failed to decide the issue of attorney's fees on appeal. 
Covey misinterprets the mandate of the Court of Appeals and argues 
that the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction by determining the 
value of Slattery's stock and awarding attorney's fees. But the 
mandate contemplated an evidentiary hearing to establish the value 
of the stock. Since the value and the disposition of the stock was 
intended to be resolved on remand, the trial court clearly had 
jurisdiction to determine the issue. In addition, the trial court 
may decide all issues raised at the trial court which were 
unresolved on appeal. Since attorney's fees and the value of the 
stock were not decided by the appellate court, the trial court had 
discretion to decide these issues. The determination of the trial 
court must therefore be sustained. 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION 
ON REMAND WHEN IT RECEIVED EVIDENCE OF 
STOCK VALUE AND ATTORNEY'S FEES 
The single legal issue presented by Covey on appeal is whether 
the trial court had jurisdiction to consider the value of 
Slattery's stock and attorney's fees in light of the Court of 
Appeals' ruling in Slattery I. At the evidentiary hearing, Covey 
objected to the trial court's consideration of stock value and 
attorney's fees, claiming that determination of those issues 
exceeded its jurisdiction on remand. R. 918-926. Despite the 
objection, Judge Young held that the remand from the Court of 
Appeals did not preclude the trial court from hearing evidence on 
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the issues which he found were unresolved by the Court of Appeals. 
Id. 
Covey asserts that the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction 
in hearing these issues because the jurisdiction of the trial court 
is limited by the mandate of the Court of Appeals. As support for 
this position Covey cites a New Mexico case which states, "The 
district courts have only such jurisdiction on remand as the 
opinion and mandate of the appellate court specifies." Vinton 
Eppsco. Inc. of Albuquerque v. Showe Homes, Inc., 638 P.2d 1070, 
1071 (N.M. 1981) . This, however, is not the law in Utah. Rule 
30(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure states: 
(a) Decision in civil cases. The court may reserve, 
affirm, modify, or otherwise dispose of any order or 
judgment appealed from. If the findings of fact in a 
case are incomplete, the court may order the trial court 
or agency to supplement, modify, or complete the findings 
to make them conform to the issues presented and the 
facts as found from the evidence and may direct the trial 
court or agency to enter judgment in accordance with the 
findings as revised. The court may also order a new 
trial or further proceedings to be conducted. If a new 
trial is granted, the court may pass upon and determine 
all questions of law involved in the case presented upon 
the appeal and necessary to the final determination of 
the case. [Emphasis added] 
The permissive language of Rule 30(a) gives significant discretion 
to the appellate court in rendering its decisions. The reviewing 
court may specifically instruct the trial court on the issues, may 
limit the trial court's areas of consideration, and may resolve all 
or a portion of the issues in the case. Ld. The trial court is 
thereafter bound by the determination of the appellate court which 
becomes the law of the case. 
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"The rule is well established and there does not 
seem to be anything to the contrary that when a case has 
been determined by a reviewing court and remanded to the 
trial court, the duty of the latter is to comply with the 
mandate of the former. The mandate is binding on the 
lower court and must be strictly followed and carried 
into effect according to its true intent and meaning as 
determined by the directions given by the reviewing 
court. . . . " 
Street v. Fourth Judicial District Court, 113 Utah 60, 191 P.2d 
153, 157 (1948)(quoting Utah Copper Co. V. District Court, 91 Utah 
377, 64 P.2d 241, 250 (1937)). The Supreme Court in Street 
addresses the exact issue presented by Covey. The Court states: 
Before examining directly into our decree, with the 
view of determining whether or not defendant court has 
violated it, it may be profitable to observe some of the 
general principles involved in the construction of the 
mandate of an appellate court to a trial court, 
particularly as to amendment of pleadings after 
remittitur. 
As a general rule, where a judgment or decree is 
affirmed or reversed and remanded with directions to 
enter a particular judgment, the trial court may not 
permit amended or supplemental pleadings to be framed to 
try rights already settled. 9 Bancroft, op. cit. Sec. 
7430. This rule is not only reasonable, but necessary, 
if litigation is ever to come to an end. After an 
appellate court has once ruled upon issues presented to 
it, such ruling becomes the law of the case, and the 
trial court is bound to follow it, even though it 
considers the ruling erroneous. 
But where the entire case is not settled by the 
appellate tribunal where certain issues are left open by 
its judgment or decree, the trial court ordinarily has 
discretion to permit amended or supplemental pleadings as 
to those matters which have been left open. 
The rule is well stated in 3 Am. Jur. 737, Sec. 
1241: "If a cause is remanded without specific 
directions, or with general directions for a new trial 
either upon an affirmance or reversal, the lower court 
has, as a general rule, the power to permit amendments 
and the parties are free to make such proper amendments 
to the pleadings as the trial court in its discretion may 
allow. . . . And while it may be said that such 
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amendments to the pleadings are not a matter of right, 
but may be allowed in the discretion of the court, it is 
the duty of the trial court to exercise it's discretion 
in the matter of allowing amendments, unless the findings 
and conclusions of the appellate court cover the entire 
case and leave nothing open for further examination, 
thereby making it the duty of the trial court to enter 
judgment in accordance with the decision rendered." 
The principles boil down to this fundamental 
proposition: As to all matters adjudicated by the 
appellate court, both the trial court and the parties are 
foreclosed from further trying those matters. They 
become the law of the case. But as to matters left open 
by the appellate court, it is within the sound discretion 
of the trial court to permit amended or supplemental 
pleadings as to those matters. [Emphasis added] 
Id. at 157-58. This general principle has also been stated: 
On remand, the trial court may consider and decide 
any matters left open by the appellate court and is free 
to make any order or direction in further progress of the 
case, not inconsistent with the decision of the appellate 
court, as to any question not presented or settled by 
such decision. The issues are generally open on a 
retrial when a case is reversed and remanded for further 
proceedings. 
5 Am. Jur. 2d Appeal & Error § 992 (1962). The law is clear that 
the issues determined and completely resolved by the appellate 
court become the law of the case and cannot be further reviewed or 
violated. However, those issues left open by the appellate court 
may be determined by the trial court on remand. 
The jurisdiction of the trial court is not dependant on the 
mandate of the reviewing court. The Utah Supreme Court stated in 
Hidden Meadows Development Co. v. Mills, 590 P.2d 1244 (Utah 
1979) (citing Larsen v. Gasberg, 43 Utah 203, 134 P. 885, 887 
(1913)) : 
The rule is well settled that, where a judgment is 
reversed and remanded with specific instruction or 
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directions, the case stands in the lower court precisely 
as it did before a trial was had in the first instance. 
The Court in Larsen stated: 
The rule is well settled that, where a judgment is 
reversed and a new trial granted without any specific 
instructions or directions, the case stands in the lower 
court precisely as it did before a trial was had in the 
first instance. The general rule in this regard is well 
stated in 3 Ency. L. & P. 579, in the following language: 
"When a decree is reversed and the cause remanded without 
specific directions, the decision of the court below is 
entirely abrogated, and the cause then stands in the 
court below precisely as if no trial had occurred, and 
that court has the same power over the record as it had 
before its decree was rendered, and it may permit 
amendments to the pleadings to the same extent that it 
might have done before the trial and in the exercise of 
the same discretion, except that it is concluded by the 
legal principles announced by the appellate court. And 
where a cause is reversed and remanded with directions to 
proceed in conformity with the view expressed in the 
opinion filed, and it appears from such opinion that the 
grounds of reversal are of a character which may be 
obviated by subsequent amendments of the pleadings or the 
introduction of additional evidence it is the duty of the 
trial court to permit the cause to be redocketed and to 
permit amendments to be made and evidence introduced on 
the hearing just as though it was then being heard for 
the first time. [Emphasis added] 
The trial court's jurisdiction is not dependant on the mandate 
issued by the reviewing court, but the issues the trial court may 
consider are limited by the rulings of the appellate court. When 
the reviewing court fails to dispose of all the issues, the trial 
court must make the final determination on those undecided issues 
without conflicting with the ruling of the reviewing court. 
Covey's position would greatly limit the jurisdiction of the trial 
court and render the trial court incapable of responding to the 
practical problems arising on remand. This result would shackle 
the entire judicial system by increasing the number of appeals and 
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preventing the trial courts from using discretion to finalize and 
dispose of cases on remand. 
Apparently, Covey misunderstands the jurisdiction of the trial 
court upon remand. Covey asserts, through cases from other 
jurisdictions, that the trial court's jurisdiction on remand is 
limited to the mandate of the reviewing court. In other words, 
Covey asserts that the trial court's jurisdiction is exclusive to 
the mandate ordered by the reviewing court. However, Covey gives 
no Utah precedent or authority for this position. Nor can it. The 
decisions of the Utah Supreme Court indicate that the jurisdiction 
of the trial court is inclusive: on remand the trial court 
possesses all of the powers granted to trial courts by the 
Constitution and statutes of the State of Utah. The only 
limitation on the trial courts' discretion is the law of the case 
created by the reviewing court. 
POINT I 
THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION 
BY CONDUCTING PROCEEDINGS TO DETERMINE THE VALUE 
OF SLATTERY'S STOCK 
The Court of Appeals in Slattery I held that Slattery was owed 
the value of the stock she owned, but the evidence of the stock's 
value was insufficient. Therefore, the findings of stock value 
were reversed. Slattery v. Covey & Co., Inc., 857 P.2d 243, 249 
(Utah App. 1993). The Court contemplated further proceedings to 
determine the value of that stock. The Court stated: 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing 
Slattery to amend her complaint to conform to evidence 
that she was owed the value of her personal accounts, but 
we determine that the evidence lacks a sufficient basis 
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to support the value assigned to those personal accounts. 
Therefore, we reverse the trial court's judgment that 
Slattery is entitled to $6,847,50 for these accounts. 
[Emphasis added] 
Id. at 249. The Court specifically reversed only the value of the 
stock and found that Slattery was owed the stock and Covey must pay 
her its value. Id. The Court's mandate instructed the trial court 
to conduct ". . . further proceedings consistent with th[e] 
opinion." Id. at 250. The "further proceedings" were to determine 
the value of the stock Slattery owned. What other proceedings 
could have been contemplated by the Court of Appeals? On remand, 
the trial court received evidence of the value of the stock and 
awarded it to Slattery. Logically, the Court of Appeals would not 
have affirmed the amendment of the complaint to conform to the 
evidence presented, and then, in the same sentence, nullified and 
invalidated the amendment by finding that evidence insufficient, 
without expecting further proceedings. The reversal contemplated 
an evidentiary hearing to establish the value of the stock Slattery 
owned. 
Even if the Court of Appeals did not specifically remand the 
case for further proceedings to determine the value of the stock, 
its value and disposition remained an unresolved issue on remand. 
When an issue is left open by the reviewing court, the trial court 
has discretion to dispose of that issue. Street v. Fourth Judicial 
District Court, 113 Utah 60, 191 P.2d 153, 158 (1948). In an 
appropriate use of its discretion, on remand the trial court 
received evidence of the stock's value and resolved the issue by 
awarding that value to Slattery. 
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Covey overstates the mandate issued by the Court of Appeals. 
A mandate is a clear statement directing the trial court's action 
on certain issues. The contrast between the mandate and the issues 
left open for the trial court's further determination on remand is 
illustrated in Slattery I. The Court excluded certain expenses and 
added another to Slattery's account and found the total allowed 
credits. The Court then stated, "We remand this particular issue 
to the trial court for entry of findings consistent with this 
opinion." [Emphasis added]. Id. at 248. The decision of the 
Court of Appeals on Slattery's expenses is a clear and complete 
disposition of that particular issue. The total credits were 
$406.24. There is no room for interpretation. 
But there is no specific mandate disposing of the stock issue. 
The Court simply reversed the finding of value. If no further 
proceedings may be conducted relating to the stock, as Covey 
suggests, what would become of the stock in Slattery's account? 
Would the stock be forfeited to Covey? Would Slattery be entitled 
to the certificates? Would the stock simply languish in the 
account with no one able to assert a beneficial interest? If the 
Court of Appeals had issued a mandate to the trial court, these 
questions would have been answered and the trial court would have 
had no discretion in answering them. But the Court of Appeals 
failed to completely dispose the stock issue and the trial court 
appropriately exercised its discretion to resolve this issue. 
Covey cites Bryfogle v. Arizona Dept. of Corrections, 739 P. 2d 
819 (Ariz. App. 1987), for the proposition that a specific mandate 
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from the appellate court cannot be exceeded by the trial court on 
remand. This is consistent with the pronouncements of the Utah 
Supreme Court in Street v. Fourth Judicial District Court, 113 Utah 
60, 191 P.2d 153 (1948), and Utah Copper Co. v. District Court, 91 
Utah 377, 64 P. 2d 241, 250 (1937) . The Utah courts have not, 
however, characterized the power of the trial court on remand as 
jurisdictional, but as discretional. Utah courts have held that if 
the discretion of the trial court is utilized to violate the 
mandate of the appellate court, the trial court would be subject to 
a writ of mandamus or appellate review. Street v. Fourth Judicial 
District Court, 113 Utah 60, 191 P.2d 153 (1948). With this 
exception, the Bryfogle and the Street decisions are consistent. 
Covey argues that the "sole purpose" of the remand was to 
correct the findings of fact to eliminate credits given to Slattery 
for the charges to her error account. Appellant's brief, p. 9. 
This position ignores the specific language of the Court of 
Appeal's opinion. The Court remanded that "particular issue" to 
the trial court for the entry of findings and a judgment consistent 
with the ruling of the Court. Slattery v. Covey & Co., Inc., 857 
P.2d 243, 248 (Utah App. 1993). But the opinion finds that 
Slattery owned stock and was entitled to be paid its value. Id. at 
249. The question reversed by the Court was the value of that 
stock. The mandate instructed that "further proceedings" be 
conducted consistent with its opinion. Id. at 250. The Court need 
not give two mandates to the trial court for the disposition of a 
single issue worth $406.24. Therefore, the purpose of the remand 
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was to correct the expenses and determine the value of the stock. 
POINT II 
THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION 
BY ALLOWING SLATTERY TO AMEND HER COMPLAINT AND 
BY CONDUCTING PROCEEDINGS TO DETERMINE SLATTERY'S 
APPELLATE ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS 
Covey claims that because the issue of attorney's fees on 
appeal was mentioned by the Court of Appeals, the trial court is 
precluded from considering whether to award attorney's fees for the 
appeal. Again, Covey justifies this position by claiming that the 
jurisdiction of the trial court is limited by the mandate of the 
Court of Appeals. This issue of law is addressed in the Argument 
above. In Slattery I, the Court of Appeals states: 
4. Slattery also seeks attorney fees on appeal, 
based on the employment contract. However, she was not 
awarded attorney fees at trial and did not appeal from 
that determination. Because Slattery does not present 
any argument to support her request for fees on appeal, 
we decline to address the issue. 
Slattery v. Covey & Co,. Inc., 857 P.2d 243, 249, n.4 (Utah App. 
1993). This refusal to address the issue of attorney's fees on 
appeal is not a determination by the Court of Appeals that 
attorney's fees are not available to Slattery for the appeal. The 
Court of Appeals did not deny, strike, or dismiss the request for 
fees. It simply refused to address the issue. Therefore, the 
Court of Appeals made no determination of attorney's fees on 
appeal. Since the issue of fees on appeal was not fully 
determined, the trial court has discretion to consider them. 
On September 1, 1993, Slattery filed a motion to amend the 
complaint to included a claim for attorney's fees. R. 804. The 
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trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing to establish the 
attorney's fees on appeal. After the evidentiary hearing, the 
issue of attorney's fees was briefed by the parties. The trial 
court issued its minute entry on October 14, 1993, which states in 
part: 
In many ways, as this Court candidly stated to 
counsel, this case illustrates the pathetic circumstances 
that can occur when one parties [sic] fail to 
realistically evaluate their cases and consider 
settlement. To require the Plaintiff to incur cost and 
fees in the amount of $15,490.05 to sustain a judgment of 
$10,801.35 is improper. The Defendant is an employing 
company with obviously greater resources to employ 
counsel and to defend claims. That alone does not 
justify imposing costs and fees. However, in this case, 
the Court finds that there was an adequate contractual 
basis and equitable basis to order that the plaintiff be 
awarded the fees incurred to protect her judgment on 
appeal. Thus the Plaintiff is awarded $15,490.05 in fees 
and costs incurred on appeal. 
R. 894-95. In the Judgment granting fees, the trial court found 
that Covey acted improperly and in bad faith. R. 896-98. Covey 
does not appeal the amount of fees or the finding of bad faith, but 
simply argues that the trial court exceeded its authority in 
awarding any fees at all. 
Covey cites Vinton Eppsco Inc. of Albuquerque v. Showe Homes, 
Inc., 97 N.M. 225, 638 P.2d 1070, 1071 (1981), for the proposition 
that "[a]ppellate courts have authority to either make an allowance 
of attorney fees on appeal or to remand to the lower court for that 
purpose." Slattery agrees that the appellate courts have authority 
to award attorneys fees or remand the case to the trial court for 
the determination of fees. However, the implication that the 
appellate courts are bound to elect one of those options is 
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contrary to the Utah law. Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure Rule 
30(a); Street v. Fourth Judicial District Court. 113 Utah 60, 191 
P. 2d 153 (1948) (both reflecting the vast discretion of the 
reviewing court to make decisions). The appellate court may not 
decide an issue, may reverse, affirm, modify, or otherwise dispose 
of the issues presented. 
The holding in Showe Homes is based on the New Mexico Supreme 
Court's decision to deny attorney's fees in the original appeal and 
reversed the trial court for exceeding its mandate when it awarded 
fees for the original appeal on remand. In Slattery I, the Court 
of Appeals did not decide the issue of attorney's fees, and 
expressly indicated that it "decline[d] to address the [attorney's 
fee] issue.11 Slattery v. Covey & Co.. Inc., 857 P.2d 243, 249, n.4 
(Utah App. 1993). Since the Court of Appeals did not decide the 
issue of attorney's fees in their decision, the mandate to the 
district court could not have precluded the authority of the 
district court to determine the issue of attorney's fees. 
The acceptance of Covey's argument would increase the number 
appeals and the cost of litigation by eliminating the discretion of 
the trial court to fully dispose of cases on remand. Appeals 
raising incidental issues encountered on remand would become 
common. In Bank of New Mexico v. Earl Rice Construction Co., 79 
N.M. 115, 440 P.2d 790 (1968), a detailed ruling and mandate was 
issued by the New Mexico Supreme Court. The mandate stated: 
NOW, THEREFORE, this cause is hereby remanded to you 
with directions to set aside the present judgment and 
enter a new judgment which (1) awards plaintiff judgment 
against Earl B. Rice and Lahoma Rice jointly and 
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severally on the promissory notes, in the amount of 
$64,754.80; (2)awards Earl Rice Construction Company, 
Inc. judgment against Plaintiff on its breach of contract 
claim, in the amount of $5,000.00 compensatory damages 
and $50,000.00 punitive damages; and (3) awards judgment 
in favor of Plaintiff on the counterclaim of Earl B. 
Rice. The successful parties are to recover their costs 
in district court; costs on appeal are to be paid equally 
by Plaintiff, Rice and the Corporation. 
Id. The mandate did not address the date interest on the judgment 
would begin to run. The trial court denied any award of interest 
because it exceeded its mandate. The appellate court then 
determined the effect of its earlier ruling, whether its 
determination constituted a reversal or a modification of the 
earlier judgment, and despite the explicit language of the mandate, 
held that the earlier judgment did not set aside but modified the 
original decision. Interest was granted from the date of the 
original judgment. Although a valid issue was presented in Earl 
Rice, under Covey's interpretation of the law, appeals of minor 
details on remand would become common, would be abused to buy time 
for the judgment debtor, and would increase the cost of litigation. 
Utah mandates are rarely as specific or detailed as the 
mandate in Earl Rice. Certainly the "mandate" set forth in 
Slattery I does not specifically dispose of all the issues relating 
to the value of the stock and attorney fees. The district court 
therefore appropriately received evidence and issued a final ruling 
on the issues. 
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POINT III 
SLATTERY IS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY'S FEES 
RELATING TO THIS APPEAL 
Slattery's contract with Covey provides that in the event of 
any litigation arising from the contract, the prevailing party 
would be entitled to recover any costs and expenses, including 
attorney's fees, incurred in the litigation. Addendum Exhibit A, 
1 14. If Slattery is successful in defending this appeal, she is 
entitled to her attorney's fees related to defending this appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
When a case is remanded from the appellate court, the trial 
court's discretion is limited by the decision of the appellate 
court. Any unresolved issues left open by the appellate court may 
be considered and decided by the trial court. Since the Court of 
Appeals in Slattery I contemplated further hearings to determine 
the value of the stock, the trial court fulfilled the mandate of 
the Court of Appeals by finding the value of the stock and awarding 
it to Slattery. Even if the Court of Appeals' mandate did not 
require the trial court to determine the value of the stock, the 
Court's decision did not determine the fate of the stock or the 
issue of attorney's fees. Therefore, the trial court was 
authorized to determine those issues in fully disposing of the 
issues. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in receiving 
evidence or ruling on these issues. Since the district court 
clearly had jurisdiction over the case and the issues unresolved by 
the Court of Appeals, the determination of the value of the stock 
and the attorney's fees awarded to Slattery are justified within 
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the court's sound discretion. The ruling of the trial court should 
be sustained. 
DATED this c^P day of March, 1995. 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I certify that I caused to be mailed a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing to David R. King, KRUSE, LANDA & MAYCOCK, L.L.C, 
Eight Floor, Bank One Tower, 50 West Broadway, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84101-2034, postage prepaid, this day of J^ larch, 1995. 
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Addendum A: Exhibit 18-D, 
Contract for the Performance of Services 
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CONTRACT FOR PERFORMANCE OF SERVICES 
THIS CONTRACT is made and entered into this .^ cs day of rtjCkeL 
19^£X by a n d between COVEY & CO.f INC., a Utah corporation, hereinafter 
referred to as "Covey," and ^tict iAj SoiVT-c:^/ * . an independent 
contractor, hereinafter referred to as "Contractor." I 
For and in consideration of the mutual promises and covenants hereinafter set 
forth, Covey and Contractor agree as follows: 
1. CONTRACT. Covey does hereby hire Contractor to perform certain 
services on its behalf and Contractor hereby accepts such contract and agrees to 
perform such services for Covey upon the terms and conditions hereinafter set forth. 
2. DUTIES. Contractor's duties shall be to act as a registered securities 
representative of Covey and to perform all duties necessary or desirable in 
connection therewith, including but not limited to, solicitation of retail accounts and 
the documentation and execution of orders in securities for clients of Contractor 
and/or Covey. 
3. WARRANTIES OF CONTRACTOR. Contractor represents and 
warrants that: he or she is registered as a general securities representative with the 
National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. (the "NASD"); £e or she is registered 
as an agent with the state of Utah; he or she is or will become registered as an agent 
in all states in which the nature or type of his or her activities require such 
registration but that he or she will neither become registered nor engage in 
securities transactions in states where Covey is not registered as a broker-dealer; he 
or she is registered and/or holds all other permits and licenses required by any 
regulatory body as a prerequisite to the performance of the type of services which 
Contractor will perform for Covey; and he or she will maintain all of the above 
registrations, permits, and licenses in effect and in good standing during the term of 
this Contract. 
4. WARRANTIES OF COVEY. Covey represents and warrants that it 
will maintain current and proper registration as a broker-dealer in the state of Utah 
and in every other state which Covey represents to Contractor are states in which 
Contractor may engage in securities transactions with customers of Covey. 
5. COMPENSATION. Covey agrees to compensate Contractor on a strict 
commission basis. Such commissions shall be paid to Contractor on the sixth 
business day of the month following the month in which such commissions were 
earned. The amount of such commissions payable to Covey to Contractor shall be 
computed and paid in accordance with the schedule attached hereto as Exhibit "A" 
and incorporated herein by reference.* Covey reserves the right to change the terms 
of the commission schedule set forth on Exhibit "A" at any time and from time to 
time upon thirty (30) days advance notice to Contractor. In any such event, the new 
scneduie snail be suosututed for the schedule currently attacned hereto as Exhibit 
"A." 
6. FACILITIES- Covey shall permit Contractor to conduct his or her 
business and render his or her services on the premises of Covey. Covey shall 
provide Contractor with order tickets, form agreements, and account cards to be used 
oy Contractor in conducting his business. Covey will also provide Contractor office 
space with desk, chair, and cabinet files. 
7. CONTRACTOR'S EXPENSES- Contractor snail be solely responsible 
for and shall pay the following costs and charges unless otherwise agreed to in 
Addendum A attached hereto and made a part hereof: 
(a) all costs of obtaining, renewing, and maintaining all licenses 
and registrations required by the applicable rules and regulations of the 
NASD; the Securities and Exchange Commission; any commodities, 
stock, options, or other exchange through which Contractor effects 
transactions; and the laws of each state in which Contractor is required to 
be so licensed and/or registered, except that Contractor shall not be 
required to pay state registration fees in each state in which Contractor is 
registered in a calendar year so long as Contractor has business in each, of 
said states which generates at least $300 in gross commissions; 
(b) fifty percent (50%) of all telephone charges for long distance 
calls made by, through, or under him or her; 
(c) the cost of any quotation machine or other device used by 
Contractor to obtain quotations or other access to the NASD's Automated 
Quotation system or similar medium (such costs can be shared with other 
contractors of Covey under arrangements between such other contractors 
and Covey) with the exception that Covey will pay the basic office charge 
for said quotation machine or devise; 
(d) dues to professional organizations or subscriptions to 
periodicals and information services; and 
(e) fifty percent (50%) all costs and charges for health, accident, 
casualty, and life insurance coverage carried by Contractor for the benefit 
of Contractor and his or her family. 
8. INVENTORY AND TRADING ACCOUNTS. In the event that 
Contractor should use Covey's inventory of securities in securities transactions 
conducted pursuant hereto, the terms and conditions of such securities transactions 
will be governed in accordance with an Exhibit WB" to be attached hereto. 
9. COVETS EXCLUSIVE PROPERTIES. Contractor acknowledges 
that the lists and ledgers of Covey's customers and transactions as they may now 
exist or may hereafter exist from time to time are valuable, special, and unique 
assets of Covey. Contractor acknowledges and agrees that Covey shall remain the 
sole and exclusive owner of such lists and ledgers, which ownership includes the sole 
and exclusive right to reproduce, use, or disclose for any purpose any or ail of the 
names, addresses, records of transactions, or other data contained thereon, whether 
such reproductions or uses were made by Contractor, Covey, or other officers, 
directors, employees, or agents of Covey. Contractor will not, directly or indirectly, 
during or after the term of his or her employment, disclose to any person without 
prior written authorization from Covey, the names, addresses, telephone numbers, 
transactions, or other data contained on such lists and ledgers; provided, that upon 
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the termination of this Contract with Covey, Contractor may take with him or her 
and make use of one copy of a list setting forth the names, addresses, and current 
stock and cash positions of personal customers of Contractor whose accounts with 
Covey were opened as a direct result of Contractor's efforts as well as one copy of his 
or her rolodex file. 
10. CONDUCT OF CONTRACTOR. Contractor acknowledges that his or 
her activities and the activities of Covey are subject to regulation by several 
different regulatory bodies. Many of such activities are regulated by formal statutes, 
rules, and regulations while others are regulated by informal interpretations of 
statutes, rules, and regulations or policy positions adopted by the various regulatory-
bodies. Contractor acknowledges that Covey has attempted to codify many of the 
more informal regulations in its Manual of Supervisory Procedures. Contractor 
hereby agrees to strictly comply with the practices, policies, and procedures 
contained in the Manual of Supervisory Procedures (as hereinafter defined) and all 
the applicable laws, rules, and regulations of each federal, state, or self-regulatory 
authority having jurisdiction over the conduct of Contractor's business, including, 
but not limited to, the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934, as well as other statutes administered by the Securities and Exchange 
Commission; the laws administered by the Commodities Futures Trading 
Commission; the Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws of the NASD, and the 
interpretations by the Board of Governors thereof; the rules of each exchange to 
which the Contractor and the conduct of his or her business is subject: and the laws of 
the respective states and the interpretations thereof which are applicable to 
Contractor's activities, all with specific emphasis on the following: 
(a) the registration or licensing requirements applicable to Covey 
and Contractor prior to conducting business in any state; 
(b) the registration provisions of the Securities Act of 1933 and the 
applicable state securities statutes with respect to the sale of "restricted" 
or "controlled" securities in the absence of registration thereunder; 
(c) the solicitation of transactions in securities and compliance 
with applicable secondary trading registration requirements' under 
applicable state securities laws; 
(d) Regulation'T" promulgated by the Federal Reserve Board; 
(e) the interpretations of the Board of Governors of the NASD 
with respect to nfree-riding" and "withholding;" 
(0 transactions effected by one person by or for the account of 
another without a proper written power of attorney or other authorization 
for such transactions; and 
(g) transactions which violate the so-called anti-fraud or anti-
manipulative provisions of federal and state securities laws. 
Contractor hereby agrees to indemnify Covey and hold it harmless from and against 
any and all losses, costs, damages, claims, causes of action, or expenses whatsoever 
(including, but not limited to, any and all legal or other expenses reasonably 
incurred in investigating, preparing, or defending against any such actions or 
threatened actions or claims) based on or arising out of or in connection with any 
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violation or alleged violation by Contractor of any of the statutes, rules, regulations, 
or interpretations described above or otherwise, and whether liability is determined 
by a court, administrative agency, or other authority having jurisdiction in the 
premises or is the result of a settlement arrived at prior to, during, or after suit. The 
foregoing indemnification is conditioned upon the Contractor being notified by 
Covey, by letter, telegram, or other advice, of any claim made against Covey or any 
action commenced against Covey, within a reasonable time after it shall have been 
provided notice of any claim or shall have been served by summons or other legal 
process, giving information as to the nature and basis of the claim, and in any event 
at least ten (10) days prior to the entry of any judgment on such claim or in such 
action, but the failure to give such notice shall not relieve Contractor of his or her 
obligation to provide indemnification for any liability whicn Covey may have to such 
person otherwise than on account of this indemnification agreement. Contractor 
shall bear the employment of counsel reasonably satisfactory to Covey, of any and all 
fees reasonably incurred by Covey in connection with such matter. Covey shall have 
the right to separate counsel in any such action and to participate in the defense 
thereof, but the fees and expenses of such independent counsel shall be at the 
expense of Covey unless (i) the employment thereof shall have been specifically 
authorized by Contractor or (ii) Contractor shall have failed to assume the defense 
and employ counsel satisfactory to Covey. 
11. CONTRACTOR RESPONSIBLE FOR LOSSES. Contractor 
acknowledges and agrees that he or she is responsible for his or her customer 
accounts and bears sole responsibility for the timeiy payment; for securities 
purchased by his or her customers and the timely delivery (in good deliverable form) 
of securities sold by his or her customers. Contractor agrees that any and all losses 
incurred by Covey in connection with the accounts of Contractor's customers, 
including but not limited to, liquidation of trades, bad checks, or failure to deliver 
"good" stock, which losses are not due to clear error on the part of Covey, shall be 
paid by Contractor. Contractor agrees to use his or her best efforts to assist Covey in 
collecting or minimizing any loss which may occur in his or her customer account. 
12. NO B ENEFITS. Contractor acknowledges that he or she has been hired 
by Covey as an independent contractor to perform specific services for Covey, 
Contractor acknowledges and agrees that Covey will not provide Contractor with 
certain of the benefits customarily provided by employers to their employees, such as 
paid vacation or pension or profitsharing benefits. Contractor further acknowledges 
that Covey will not withhold taxes from Contractor's compensation and that 
Contractor is responsible to pay any and all applicable taxes on his or her earnings 
and to make any estimated payments required by state or federal taxing authorities 
in connection therewith. 
13. RIGHT OF OFFSET. Any and all amounts due and owing to Covey 
from Contractor by reason of any event described herein or for any breach by 
Contractor of any term, covenant, or condition hereof may be offset by Covey, at its 
sole discretion, against any compensation due and owing to Contractor, whether 
during the term hereof, upon the'termination of this Contract, or otherwise or mav 
be offset by Covey against any and all securities, accounts, or other properties of 
Contractor held in Contractor's account or accounts with Covey or otherwise under 
the care, custody, or control of Covey, including the products and proceeds thereof. 
Any sales of Contractor's property effected by Covey in connection with this right of 
offset may be public or orivate and may be made without notice or advertisement 
and in such manner as Covey may, in its discretion, determine, with the exception 
that Covey will delay effecting its right of offset provided Contractor is engaged m 
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good faith and bona fide efforts to resolve any dispute with Covey over all such 
amounts owed to Covey and/or provided Contractor is engaged in good faith and bona 
fide efforts to make payment ot all such amounts owed to Covey. All such amounts 
owed to Coveyshall bear interest at a rate which is 2i% above Covey's cost for 
borrowed funds per annum, from and after the due date, both before and after 
judgment if applicable. If any such amounts owed to Covey are due and owing to 
Covey by Contractor on the date of termination of this Contract, Contractor agrees to 
execute and deliver to Covey a promissory note evidencing such amounts and the 
interest applicable thereto, which note shall be due on demand of Covey. 
14. ATTORNEY'S FEES. In the event of any litigation or other legal 
proceeding between the parties arising from this Contract, the prevailing party shall 
be entitled to recover, in addition to any other relief awarded or granted, his or her 
reasonable costs and expenses (including attorney's fees) incurred in connection with 
the proceeding, 
15. TE RM. The term of this Contract shall commence on the date hereof and 
shall remain in full force and effect for a period of one (1) year. Thereafter, the term 
of this Contract shall automatically be extended for successive and consecutive 
terms of one (1) year each unless and until terminated by either party in writing at 
least fourteen (14) days in advance of the effective date of termination; provided, that 
in the event Contractor fails to perform any of the obligations to be performed by Mm 
or her hereunder, Covey may terminate this Contract immediately upon notice to 
Contractor. 
16. GOVERNING LAW. This Contract is being executed and delivered in 
the state of Utah and shall be governed by and construed in accordance with the laws 
of the state of Utah. 
17. SEVERABILITY. In the event any provision of this Contract, or the 
application of any such provision to any person or circumstance, shall conflict with or 
be held invalid or unenforceable under the laws of any jurisdiction by a court having 
jurisdiction in the premises, then such conflict shall not affect any other provision of 
this Contract which can be given effect without the conflicting provision, and the 
remainder of the Contract or the application of such provisions to persons or 
circumstances other than those as to which such provisions are held, invalid or 
unenforceable shall not be affected thereby. The invalidity or unenforceability of 
this Contract or any provision thereof in any jurisdiction shall not affect the validity 
or enforceability of this Contract or of such provision in any other jurisdiction. To 
this end, the provisions of this Contract are declared to be severable. 
18. REFORMATION. In the event it is determined by a court having 
jurisdiction in the premises that any provision herein is void or unenforceable by 
reason of public policy, then this Contract shall continue in full force and effect to the 
extent permissible under the existing public policy. In this regard, the parties 
hereby authorize the court having jurisdiction of the matter to determine the extent 
to which this Contract is enforceable and to enforce the same in accordance with the 
existing public policy in any manner which is acceptable to the court. It is 
understood by the parties that Covey and Contractor would not have entered into 
this Contract but for the existence of the indemnification provisions contained 
herein. 
19. NON- WAIVER. The failure by Covey to object to or give notice of any 
default by Contractor of any term, covenant, or condition hereof shall not constitute 
a waiver by Covey of any subsequent breach or default under this Contract. 
20. HEADINGS. The headings of the paragraphs contained herein are for 
convenience only and are not intended to define or limit the contents thereof* 
21. BINDING EFFECT. All of the rights and obligations of the parties to 
this Contract shall bind and the benefits shall inure to their respective heirs, legal 
representatives, successors, and assigns. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, this agreement has been executed as of the date 
first above written. 
COVE Y&CO^INC. f ft 
Dilfy Autnonzea Officer \ 
Independent Contractor 
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EXHIBIT "An 
COMMISSION COMPENSATION 
Contractor and Covey agree that Covey will pay Contractor according to the 
following schedule, where gross commissions are defined as the commissions 
generated by either contractor or customer transactions less a $5 ticket charge per 
each agency trade, less any give up charge on listed trades: 
Percentage of 
Gross Commission 
Monthly Gross Commission Pavable to Contractor 
Under $2,000 
$2,000 to less than $4,000 






In the event Contractor's gross commissions should reach $50,000 during any 
Covey fiscal year, Contractor will be paid at least 50% of gross commissions 
generated by Contractor for said entire fiscal year. Any commission adjustments 
necessary to meet the requirements of this paragraph will be made at the end of the 
Covey fiscal year in which such adjustments are required. 
Additional percentages will be paid to Contractor in the same manner as set 
forth in the foregoing paragraph when Contractor's annual gross commissions 
during any Covey fiscal year reach the following levels: 
Additional Percentage Paid 
Annual Gross Commission on Total Gross Commission 
Over $120,000 An additional 2\% 
Over $200,000 An additional 1\% 
Over $300,000 An additional 2£% 
All of the foregoing provisions of this Exhibit "A" notwithstanding, during his 
or her first full year of employment, the percentage of gross commission payable to 
Contractor will not be less than 50% on either a monthly or yearly basis. 
Employment date: 
COVEY & CO., INC. 
Duly Authorized Officer 
EXHIBIT "Bw 
TRADING ACCOUNTS (Traders) 
Contractor and Covey agree that all profits and losses resulting" from. 
Contractor's use of Covey's inventory of securities (trading account #98-000-
) will be split on an equal 50/50 basis after deducting a $4.00 ticket charge 
fo7 each wnolesale trade. Profits and losses will be settled on the 15th.calendar day 
of the month in which profits and losses occurred. 
Contractor will maintain a deposit with Covey in an amount equal to 50% of 
the market value of his trading account. For periods of time solely within the 
discretion of Covey, Covey may allow the market value of Contractor's trading 
account to exceed 50% of Contractor's deposit. During such periods, Contractor will 
be charged interest on the amount of Contractor's trading account market value in 
excess of 50% of Contractor's deposit at a per annum rate equal to Covey's cost for 
borrowed funds. In the event Contractor's deposit is in excess of 50% of the market 
value of Contractor's trading account, Covey agrees to pay Contractor interest on 
such excess at a per annum rate equal to the per annum rate Daid by Covey to its 
customers on free credit balances. The purpose of Contractor's deposit is to assist in 
the financing of the securities positions maintained in Contractor's trading account 
(98-000- ) as well as to offset any losses which may occur in said trading 
account. 
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E X H I B I T S 
TRADING ACCOUNTS (Registered Representatives) 
It will be within the sole discretion of Covey to allow Contractor (who is not 
classified.as a "trader" for Covey) to utilize Covey's inventory of securities in 
transactions effected by Contractor. In the event that Covey should exercise its 
discretion to allow Contractor to so utilize its inventory of securities, no monetary 
deposit will be required of Contractor of Covey with the exception that it shall be 
within the sole discretion of Covey to require Contractor to make a deposit of up to 
25% of the market value of any securities position consisting of Covey's inventory of 
securities carried by Contractor from the end of any month to the beginning of the 
following month. It will also be within the sole discretion of Covey to either allow 
Contractor to carry a securities position consisting of Covey's inventory of securities 
over from the end of any month to the beginning 01 the following month or to prohibit 
the same. 
All profits realized by Contractor from the use of Covey's inventory of securities 
will be recorded as part of Contractor's gross commission and Contractor will be paid 
a portion of said profits in accordance with the commission schedules set forth in 
Exhibit "A" to this agreement. All losses realized by Contractor from the use of 
Covey's inventory of securities will first be subtracted from the total sales credit 
generated in Covey's inventory account for the same time period and thereafter will 
be debited to Contractor's "error account" where it will become an obligation owed by 
Contractor to Covey. It is hereby understood that Contractor is liable to Covey for 
100% of all losses realized by Contractor through the utilization of Covey's inventory 
of securities. 
Regular commissions will be computed on transactions effected by Contractor 
utilizing Covey's inventory of securities at rates periodically negotiated between 
Covey and Contractor. Said commissions will be recorded as part of Contractor's 
gross commissions and Contractor will be paid a portion of said commissions in 
accordance with Schedule "A" to this agreement. However, Contractor and Covey 
agree that an amount of S5 will be deducted for each trade that generates a 
commission effected by Contractor utilizing Covey's inventory of securities from the 
portion of Contractor's gross commissions payable to Contractor in accordance with 
Schedule "A" attached to this agreement. 
COVEY & CO., INC. 
By: \i )a-+ 
Duly Authorized Officer 
Independent Contractor 
H 
Addendum to Contract for 
Performance of Services 
I, Susan Slattery , hereby acknowledge and affirm that 
the attached Contract for Performance of Services dated 3*30-88 is 
a true, accurate, and complete description of the terms and conditions of my 
agreement with Covey & Co., Inc., for performance of services for said firm from 
7-20-37 until execution of the at tached Cont rac t for 
Performance of Services to which this document is an addendum and accurately 
describes the terms of our oral agreement that has been in effect since such date. 
Independent Contractor \ ^ 
COVEY & CO., INC. 
By: L.kjjsr; 
July Authorized Officer 
